02mechanism · on-chain contracts
Recording a threat, staking behind it, enforcing per-agent policy, and holding funds in a screening vault all live as contracts onchain. No off-chain blocklist, no trusted middleman. The same stack runs on Base and Solana, with more chains coming. Wane is non-custodial: it can only block a flagged action, never move your funds, and only your own wallet can drive it. Per-transaction and daily spend caps, function-selector and token allowlists, a kill switch, and a policy TTL are all enforced in-contract, so a flagged or out-of-scope action reverts before value moves. Every record is on-chain and the whole stack is open source, so you verify it instead of trusting us.
01 · contractref Registry
Record and check
An attacked agent records the threat once as an antibody, naming the bad address, its contract bytecode hash, or a call pattern. Every other agent reads that verdict before it signs.
- ·one agent records, the whole network reads
- ·reads are a free view call, so reading is immunity
- ·a redeploy does not dodge it: bytecode is matched too
02 · contractref Registry
Stake and challenge
Every antibody is backed by staked $WANE. Anyone can challenge a false one inside the window, and if it is overturned the publisher is slashed and the challenger paid.
- ·honest records earn, false records bleed
- ·challenges resolve against on-chain evidence
- ·lying costs more than it ever returns
03 · contractref Policy + Delegate
Screen and revert
An agent enrolls a policy: which threats to block, spend caps, a kill switch. Actions routed through its EIP-7702 delegate are screened against that policy on-chain, and a flagged target reverts before any value moves.
- ·the owner picks what to block, Wane enforces it
- ·the delegate can only block, never move funds
- ·screening happens on-chain, not as a warning
04 · contractref Vault
Hold and screen
For custody-grade protection, funds live inside a non-custodial WaneVault we built ourselves. Only the owner drives it, every outbound send is screened against the policy on-chain, and a flagged recipient reverts before value moves. No raw-send bypass, and the real ERC-20 recipient is decoded and screened too.
- ·funds in-contract, owner-driven, no raw-send bypass
- ·the real ERC-20 recipient is decoded and screened
- ·the owner can always withdraw, funds are never trapped